Salesian Literature

Chapter 7  :  Perfect virtues never come singly

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We do not acquire all the virtues at once, but one after another as reason – the soul’s vital principle, as it were – takes hold first of one passion, then of another, to control and guide them.

 

Virtues, you see, are virtues only because they harmonize with the rule of reason.  No action can be called virtuous unless it is the result of love for the perfect order of right reason.  The man who love a particular virtue, for love of the beauty of reason that shines through it, will love all the virtues; he will find the same motive in every one.  His love for each will be more or less in proportion to the perfection reason each displays.

 

The man who loves generosity, but not chastity, clearly shows that he is not loving generosity for the sake of reason’s perfect order.  The beauty of the rule of reason is much more evident in chastity – and where the cause is stronger, the effects should be stronger too.  It is a clear sign, then, that such a man’s attraction to generosity is not inspired by the motive of reason.  Consequently, his generosity is only an apparent virtue; it is not directed in accordance with reason, the principle of every virtue, but for some alien motive.

 

Obviously we cannot practise all the virtues at once; opportunities never occur simultaneously.  Some virtues, therefore, were not practised even by the greatest of the saints.  St. Paul, the first hermit, for example: what occasion did he have for forgiving injuries, or for practising courtesy, generosity, meekness?  Yet all such souls were so fond of reason’s perfect order that, although they did not possess all the virtues in deed, they had them in desire; they knew a readiness, a disposition, to follow the commands of reason wholly and unreservedly, whatever happened.

 

Some tendencies re wrongly thought to be virtues, when they are simply natural gifts of graces.  Nothing is commoner than to find people who are naturally moderate, simple, kind, reserved, even chaste and trustworthy.  Such have all the appearance of virtue, yet none of the merit – this is no ore praiseworthy than naturally evil tendencies are blameworthy before we give them our free and deliberate consent.  There is no virtue in being a naturally small eater, but it is a great virtue to fast deliberately; there is no virtue in possessing a reserved temperament, but much virtue in holding our peace at the dictate of reason.

 

Many people think they possess virtues, when they are not given to contrary vices.  The man who has never been attacked can truly boast of never running away; he cannot boast of his bravery.  The man who has never been thwarted may rejoice at never having been impatient; he cannot be pleased with his patience.  So people imagine they possess virtues, when all they have is a natural tendency towards good; and because they can have a tendency towards one thing without another, they judge virtues in the same way.

 

Most assuredly, St. Augustine, in a letter he wrote to St. Jerome, shows that we can have one virtue of a kind by itself; but we cannot have perfect virtues without having them all.  As for vices, however, we can have those singly; in fact, it is impossible to have them all at once.

 

It does not follow, therefore, that the man who loses all the virtues gains all the vices, for almost all the virtues have two contrary vices, opposed not merely to the virtue, but to each other.  The man who has lost the virtue of bravery, through rashness, cannot be a coward too; the man who loses the virtue of generosity, through extravagance, cannot also be accused of meanness.

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